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Abstract
For incomplete preference relations that are represented by multiple priors and/or
multiple -possibly multivariate- utility functions, we define a certainty equivalent as well
as the utility indifference price bounds as set-valued functions of the claim. Furthermore,
we motivate and introduce the notion of a weak and a strong certainty equivalent. We will
show that our definitions contain as special cases some definitions found in the literature so
far on complete or special incomplete preferences. We prove monotonicity and convexity
properties of utility buy and sell prices that hold in total analogy to the properties of the
scalar indifference prices for complete preferences. We show how the (weak and strong)
set-valued certainty equivalent as well as the indifference price bounds can be computed or
approximated by solving convex vector optimization problems. Numerical examples and
their economic interpretations are given for the univariate as well as for the multivariate
case.
Keywords: utility maximization, indifference price bounds, certainty equivalent, incom-
plete preferences, convex vector optimization.
JEL Classification: D81, C61, G13
1 Introduction
The certainty equivalent of a random payoff is a guaranteed return that a decision maker
would accept now as it yields the same amount of desirability as the uncertain return that
will be received in the future. Indifference pricing can be seen as a similar concept adapted to
a dynamic setting. It plays an important role in pricing in incomplete markets as it typically
yields a more narrow pricing interval compared to the often very wide no-arbitrage pricing
interval, see for instance [17].
The certainty equivalent and utility indifference pricing are well studied for complete
preference relations that can be represented by a single univariate utility function and there
are also some extensions for complete preferences represented by a single multivariate utility
function. However, the completeness assumption of the preference relation is restrictive as it
ignores the typical ‘indecisiveness’ that individuals face. This concern was stated already by
von Neumann and Morgenstern in their 1947 paper [33] as “It is conceivable -and may even
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in a way be more realistic- to allow for cases where the individual is neither able to state
which of two alternatives he prefers nor that they are equally desirable.” As Aumann [2] and
many researchers agreed afterwards, it is natural and indeed more realistic to exclude the
completeness axiom when considering preference relations.
We introduce a certainty equivalent and indifference buy (and sell) price concepts for
underlying preferences that are not necessarily complete. In particular, let us consider a
probability space (Ω,F ,P), the set of all F-measurable Rd-valued random vectors L0(F ,Rd)
and a preorder % on L0(F ,Rd).
Note that if d = 1 and the preference relation is complete, then the certainty equivalent
of a random amount Z ∈ L0(F ,R) can be described as the deterministic amount, denoted by
C(Z), satisfying Z ∼ C(Z). Under standard monotonicity and continuity assumptions, C(Z)
exists and it is unique, hence well-defined. When d > 1, the deterministic amount indifferent
to Z ∈ L0(F ,Rd) may not be unique. A natural way to deal with this problem is to consider
the set of all such certain amounts. In other words, one can define the certainty equivalent as
C(Z) := {c ∈ Rd| c ∼ Z}
for complete as well as for incomplete preference relations. However, it is restrictive in the
sense that whenever the preferences are incomplete, the certainty equivalent may be an empty
set, and thus, it may fail to capture all the information that it captures in the complete
preference case. Therefore, we propose to consider also the set of certain amounts c for
which the decision maker prefers c to Z; and symmetrically, the set of certain amounts c
for which the decision maker prefers Z to c, that is, we consider the sets {c ∈ Rd| c % Z}
and {c ∈ Rd| c - Z}. Clearly, the certainty equivalent is the intersection of these two sets,
but whenever it is empty, the two sets above would still provide the full information to the
decision maker.
Mimicking the definition for the certainty equivalent, the indifference buy (sell) price of
a claim C could be defined as the set of prices p such that the decision maker is indifferent
between buying (selling) the claim at price p and not buying (selling) it at all. Since such
price may not exist when the preference relation is incomplete, we instead consider the set
of all prices for which the decision maker has a preference of buying/selling the claim over
taking no action, namely, the set valued buy (sell) prices.
In order to analyze these set-valued concepts in detail and in order to be able to compute
these for practical reasons, we assume for the rest of the paper that the underlying probability
space is finite and the incomplete preference relation accepts a representation. Note that the
incompleteness of preferences of a decision maker may stem from different reasons. First,
certain outcomes might be incomparable for the decision maker. A simple example is the
case where the decision maker is a committee instead of an individual. Ok [28], and Dubra,
Maccheroni, and Ok [11] suggested vector-valued utility representations in order to deal with
such preferences. Secondly, even though the decision maker has a complete preference over
the set of all outcomes, the incompleteness may occur because of the decision maker’s inde-
cisiveness on the likelihood of the states of the world. This is known as Bewley’s model of
Knightian uncertainty [5].
In 2006, Nau [26] considered preferences which are allowed to be incomplete in both senses
and studied the representation of them. Indeed, allowing both types of incompleteness leads
to a representation of preferences by a set of probability measures paired with utility func-
tions. The representations of incomplete preferences are further studied for instance by Ok,
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Ortoleva and Riella [29] and Galaabaatar and Karni [14]. In the former, single-prior expected
multi-utility representation and multi-prior expected single-utility representation; whereas in
the latter multi-prior expected multi-utility representation of incomplete preferences are ax-
iomatized. In both papers the state space is assumed to be finite. In [14], the outcome (prize)
space is also assumed to be finite, whereas in [29] it is a compact metric space.
In this paper, the state space is assumed to be finite and the outcome space is Rd for
d ≥ 1. We consider preferences on Rd-valued random vectors where the utility functions are
multivariate for d > 1 and where the preference relations are represented by a set of probability
measures and a set of utility functions as in [14]. As stated in [26], this representation preserves
the separation of information of beliefs from information about values, which is observed often
in practice. Note however that it is also possible to consider a set of probability-utility pairs
as in [26] without changing the main results of this paper.
As stated before, the certainty equivalent set can be empty and in order to capture the
full information one can consider the set of better/worse values instead of considering the
indifferent ones. Indeed, in the special case d = 1 and an incomplete preference relation
admitting a single-prior expected multi-utility representation, Armbruster and Delage [1]
defined a ‘strong certainty equivalent’. In a symmetrical way, it is also possible to consider
a ‘weak certainty equivalent’. A direct extension of this definition to the case d > 1 is
not straight forward, but the construction of the set of all better/worse values described
above allows us to define a set-valued strong certainty equivalent as well as a set-valued weak
certainty equivalent also in this case. This definition reduces indeed to the usual definition
whenever d = 1 and the preference relation is complete, as well as to the definition of [1]
when d = 1 and the incomplete preference relation admits a single-prior expected multi-
utility representation. Properties, interpretations and examples will be given for the case
d > 1 as well as for d = 1.
In the literature, there are different certainty equivalent concepts for d > 1 when a com-
plete preference relation admitting a single-prior single-utility representation with a multivari-
ate utility function is considered, see the survey [30]. In [30], it is stated that no vector-valued
or set-valued certainty equivalent concept has been introduced for multivariate utility func-
tions so far. However, a set-valued certainty equivalent definition is provided in [34] for a
multi-asset game setting. In particular, a set-valued utility function, which depends on the
exchange structure of the multi-asset model and a vector valued utility function, as well as a
set valued certainty equivalent for this particular setting are introduced in [34]. A paramet-
ric representation of the certainty equivalent of a particular game, where a component-wise
vector valued utility function is used to define the set valued utility, is computed analytically.
Here, we provide a set-valued definition of a certainty equivalent for a much more general
setting.
In addition to the certainty equivalent, we study utility indifference price bounds under an
incomplete preference that admits a multi-prior expected multi-utility representation where
utility functions are allowed to be multivariate. This is done by first considering the set-valued
buy and sell prices and then defining the utility indifference price bound as the boundaries of
these sets. We show that these definitions of buy and sell price bounds have intuitive interpre-
tations and they recover the complete preference case when the utility function is univariate.
Moreover, we will prove that the set-valued buy and sell prices satisfy some monotonicity
and convexity properties in total analogy to the properties of the scalar indifference prices for
complete preferences.
Utility indifference buy and sell prices for a complete preference relation represented by
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a multivariate utility function under proportional transacation costs have been studied by
Benedetti and Campi in [3]. Accordingly, the buy and sell prices, pbj, p
s
j are defined in terms
of a single currency j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. It has been shown in [3] that pbj, psj are well defined, they
exists uniquely under the conical market model. We show that the set-valued prices contain
the scalar prices defined in [3]. In particular, pbjej and p
s
jej for all j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, where ej is
the unit vector with jth component being 1, are on the boundary of the set-valued buy and
sell prices, respectively. They correspond to the indifference prices, if one has initial capital in
one of the d currencies only. In contrast, the set-valued indifference price bounds defined here
also allow for an initial portfolio in the d currencies and allow also for incomplete preference
relations.
Recently, Hamel and Wang [16] have considered the utility maximization problem under
proportional transaction costs, where the market is modeled by solvency cones and the pref-
erences are represented by component-wise utility functions. The motivation behind this is
that independent from holdings in the other assets, the investor has a scalar utility function
for each of them. Clearly, this is a special type of vector-valued utility function. We consider
this set up as a special case and discuss the certainty equivalent and indifference price bounds
concepts introduced here under this set up.
For practical reasons, it is important that the set valued certainty equivalent and the buy
and sell price bounds introduced here can be computed as well. Indeed, we show that the
computations require solving convex vector optimization problems (CVOPs).
In the literature, there are several algorithms and methods to ‘solve’ some specific sub-
classes of CVOPs, see the survey paper by Ruzika andWiecek [32]. For more general problems,
Ehrgott, Shao and Scho¨bel [12] developed an approximation algorithm and more recently,
Lo¨hne, Rudloff and Ulus [24] generalized Benson’s algorithm (see [4]) and proposed two al-
gorithms to generate approximations to the set of all efficient values in the objective space.
One of the algorithms is the extension of the one proposed in [12] while the second one is the
‘geometric dual’ of it.
We show that as long as not empty, the set-valued (strong/weak) certainty equivalent can
be computed by solving CVOPs. Moreover, as in the complete preference case, the compu-
tations of the buy and sell price bounds require solving the utility maximization problem,
which is naturally modeled as a CVOP in our setting. We use the algorithms provided in
[24] to approximately solve the utility maximization problem. We show that it is possible to
compute inner and outer ‘approximations’ to the set-valued buy and sell prices by solving
CVOPs where the solution of the utility maximization problem is taken as an input. As in the
complete preference case, solving the optimization problem(s) also yields the hedge positions.
In the example section, we illustrate the economic meaning of our definitions of the set-valued
certainty equivalent as well as the set-valued buy and sell prices.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notation that
is used throughout this paper and review some basic results on classical utility indifference
pricing and on representations of incomplete preference relations. In Section 3, we introduce
the set-valued definition of the certainty equivalent as well as the strong and weak version
of it. Set-valued buy and sell prices as well as indifference price bounds are introduced in
Section 4. In this section, we also prove the properties of set-valued buy and sell prices.
The computations of these set valued quantities are explained in Section 5. The last section
provide some special cases and numerical examples. In Section 6.1, we set d = 1 and consider
univariate utility functions, while in Section 6.2, we consider the conical market model for
4
d > 1.
2 Preliminaries
In the following we introduce some basic notions regarding order relations and convex vector
optimization problems. Then, we review the basic definition of indifference pricing in the
classical expected utility theory. Finally, we recall the utility representations for incomplete
preference relations that will be used here.
2.1 Order Relations
A convex cone K ⊆ Rq is said to be solid, if it has a non-empty interior; pointed if it does
not contain any line; and non-trivial if {0} ( K ( Rq. A non-trivial convex pointed cone K
defines a partial ordering ≤K on Rq: v ≤K w if and only if w− v ∈ K; v <K w if and only if
w − v ∈ intK; and v K w if and only if w − v ∈ K \ {0}.
Let K ⊆ Rq be a non-trivial convex pointed cone and X ⊆ Rd a convex set. A function
f : X → Rq is said to be K-convex if f(αx+ (1− α)y) ≤K αf(x) + (1− α)f(y) holds for all
x, y ∈ X, α ∈ [0, 1], and K-concave if −f is K-convex., see e.g. [25, Definition 6.1].
Let A be a subset of Rq. A point y ∈ A is called a K-minimal element of A if there exists
no x ∈ A \ {y} with x ≤K y. If K is solid, then a point y ∈ A is called weakly K-minimal
element if there exists no x ∈ A with x <K y. The set of all (weakly) K-minimal elements
of A is denoted by (w)MinK (A). The set of (weakly) K-maximal elements is defined by
(w)MaxK (A) := (w)Min−K (A).
A convex pointed cone K also defines two order relations on the power set of Rq as follows
(see for instance [15, 21]): For A,B ⊆ Rq
A 4K B :⇐⇒ B ⊆ A+K, A 2K B :⇐⇒ A ⊆ B −K. (1)
A set A ⊆ Rq is said to be an upper set with respect to K if A = A + K, a lower set with
respect to K if A = A−K. If A is a closed upper set, then wMinK A = bdA; similarly if A
is a closed lower set, then wMaxK A = bdA.
If A and B are closed upper sets with respect to K, then we have
A 4K B ⇐⇒ MinK A 4K MinK B ⇐⇒ A ⊇ B;
similarly, if A and B are closed lower sets with respect to K, then it is true that
A 2K B ⇐⇒ MaxK A 2K MaxK B ⇐⇒ A ⊆ B.
Whenever the ordering cone is Rq+ = {r ∈ Rq| ri ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , q}, we write ≤,4,2
instead of ≤Rq
+
,4Rq
+
,2Rq
+
; we say (weakly) minimal/maximal element instead of (weakly)
Rq+-minimal / R
q
+-maximal element, and denote the set of all such elements by (w)Min (·) /
(w)Max (·). Moreover, an upper (lower) set with respect to Rq+ is simply said to be an upper
(lower) set.
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2.2 Convex Vector Optimization Problems
A convex vector optimization problem is to
minimize f(x) with respect to ≤K subject to g(x) ≤M 0, (P)
where K ⊆ Rq, and M ⊆ Rm are non-trivial pointed convex ordering cones with nonempty
interior, the vector-valued objective function f(x) = (f1, . . . , fq) : Rd → Rq is K-convex, and
the constraint function g = (g1, . . . , gm) : Rd → Rm is M -convex (see for example [24, 25]).
We denote the feasible region of (P) by X := {x ∈ Rd| g(x) ≤M 0}.
The set P := cl (f(X )+K) is called the upper image; it is an upper set with respect to K
and it satisfies wMinK(P) = bdP. (P) is said to be bounded if the upper image is contained
in {y} +K for some y ∈ Rq, that is, if P ⊆ {y} +K. A point x¯ ∈ X is a (weak) minimizer
for (P) if f(x¯) is a (weakly) K-minimal element of f(X ).
We consider a solution concept for CVOPs that relates a solution to an inner and an outer
approximation of the upper image P. Throughout k ∈ intK is fixed.
Definition 2.1 ([24]). For a bounded problem (P), a nonempty finite set X¯ ⊆ X is called a
finite (weak) ǫ-solution of (P) if it consists of only (weak) minimizers and satisfies
conv f(X¯ ) +K − ǫ{k} ⊇ P. (2)
There are many different scalarization techniques for vector optimization problems. Two
well-known ones will be used throughout.
The weighted sum scalarization of (P) for w ∈ Rq is defined as the convex program
minimize wT f(x) subject to g(x) ≤M 0. (Pw)
The following proposition is well-known for CVOPs, see e.g. [19]. Here K+ := {y ∈ Rq| ∀k ∈
K : kT y ≥ 0} is the positive dual cone of K.
Proposition 2.2 ([19]). An optimal solution of (Pw) for w ∈ K+ \ {0} is a weak minimizer
of (P). Moreover, if X ⊆ Rd is a non-empty closed set, then for each weak minimizer x¯
of (P), there exists w ∈ K+ \ {0} such that x¯ is an optimal solution to (Pw).
The Pascoletti-Serafini [31] scalarization of (P) for point v ∈ Rq and direction d ∈ Rq is
defined as the convex program
minimize ρ subject to g(x) ≤M 0, f(x)− ρd ≤K v, ρ ∈ R. (P(v,d))
Proposition 2.3 ([13]). Let (ρ¯, x¯) be an optimal solution of (P(v,d)) for v ∈ Rq, d ∈ K \ {0}.
Then x¯ is a weak minimizer of (P).
A maximization problem withK-concave objective function f(·) is the negative of a CVOP
with objective function −f(·). Clearly, the lower image cl (f(X ) − K) of a maximization
problem is the negative of the upper image of the corresponding CVOP.
Remark 2.4. In [24], Lo¨hne, Rudloff and Ulus proposed primal and dual approximation
algorithms to solve bounded CVOPs where ordering cones K and M are polyhedral. Both
algorithms return finite weak ǫ-solutions to (P). A weak ǫ-solution X¯ to (P) provides an inner
and an outer approximation to the upper image P as
Pin := conv f(X¯ ) +K ⊆ P ⊆ conv f(X¯ ) +K − ǫ{k} =: Pout.
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Note that by Proposition 2.2, there exists wx ∈ K+ \ {0} such that x ∈ X¯ is an optimal
solution to the weighted sum scalarization problem (Pw) for w = wx. The algorithms in [24]
returns also the set of these weight vectors W = {wx ∈ K \ {0}| x ∈ X¯ }. Note that whenever
a problem is not known to be bounded, the algorithms in [24] may be employed and as long
as they return a solution, it is guaranteed that the problem is bounded and the solutions
returned by the algorithm is correct.
If no ordering cone is given in (P), then the ordering cone is taken as the positive orthant,
that is, K = Rq+.
2.3 Classical Utility Indifference Pricing
Utility indifference pricing under a complete preference, which is represented by a utility
function u : R → R ∪ {−∞} is well-defined and studied in the literature, see the overview
by Henderson and Hobson [17] and references therein. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space
and L0(F ,R) be the set of all F-measurable real-valued random variables. Recall that the
utility indifference buy price pb ∈ R is the price at which the investor is indifferent between
paying nothing and not having claim CT ∈ L0(F ,R), and paying pb at time t = 0 to receive
the claim at time t = T . In other words, pb is a solution of
sup
VT∈A(x0−pb)
Eu(VT + CT ) = sup
VT∈A(x0)
Eu(VT ),
where x0 is the initial endowment, and A(·) is the set of all wealth which can be generated
from the corresponding initial wealth. Similarly, the utility indifference sell price ps ∈ R is
defined as a solution of
sup
VT∈A(x0+ps)
Eu(VT − CT ) = sup
VT∈A(x0)
Eu(VT ).
Note that indifference buy and sell prices can be seen as the bounds on (buy and sell) prices for
which one has a strict preference of buying and selling, respectively. Then, one can describe
the utility indifference buy price as the boundary of the set P b of all prices at which buying the
claim is at least as preferable as taking no action. Similarly, the utility indifference sell price
is the boundary of the set P s of all prices at which selling the claim is at least as preferable
as taking no action, respectively. More precisely, if we define
P b := {p ∈ R | sup
VT∈A(x0−p)
Eu(VT + CT ) ≥ sup
VT∈A(x0)
Eu(VT )},
P s := {p ∈ R | sup
VT∈A(x0+p)
Eu(VT − CT ) ≥ sup
VT∈A(x0)
Eu(VT )},
(3)
then, as long as prices pb and ps exists we have P b = (−∞, pb], P s = [ps,∞). Hence,
pb = bdP b and ps = bdP s. This point of view will be helpful when defining indifference
prices for incomplete preference relations.
There are alternative approaches to define the indifference buy and sell prices in the
literature. Indeed, there is a recent discussion stating that the indifference prices provided
above satisfy the so called “complementary symmetry property”, see for instance [22, 10]; and
there are experiments showing that this property is systematically violated ([6]). Accordingly,
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it is possible to define, for instance, the utility indifference sell price as a solution of
sup
VT∈A(x0)
Eu(VT + CT ) = sup
VT∈A(x0+ps)
Eu(VT ),
which would lead to an alternative description for P s. However, when we discuss the exten-
sions of these concepts in Section 4, we keep these sets as in (3), since they are quite standard
for Financial Mathematics, see for instance [8, 17, 9, 3, 18].
2.4 Utility Representations for Incomplete Preferences
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a finite probability space, and L0(F ,Rd) be the set of all F-measurable
random variables which take their values in Rd. Denote the set of all continuous extended
real-valued functions on Rd by C(Rd), and the set of all probability measures on Ω byM1(Ω).
Throughout this paper, we consider the preference relations on the set L0(F ,Rd). More-
over, we consider a utility representation given as follows.
Definition 2.5. A preference relation % on L0(F ,Rd) is said to admit a multi-prior expected
multi-utility representation if there exists a non-empty subset U of C(Rd) and a non-empty
subset Q of M1(Ω) such that, for random variables Y,Z in L0(F ,Rd), we have
Y % Z ⇐⇒ ∀u ∈ U ,∀Q ∈ Q : EQu(Y ) ≥ EQu(Z).
This type of representations for incomplete preferences are studied for instance in [26,
29, 14]. As a special case we also consider preference relations which admit a multi-prior
expected single-utility representation (U is a singleton) and a single-prior expected multi-utility
representation (Q is a singleton) as defined in [29].
Remark 2.6. As usual we use the following notation throughout:
Y ∼ Z ⇐⇒ Y % Z and Z % Y.
In [29], the necessary and sufficient conditions (assumptions both on the preference relation
and on the set of the acts) for a preference relation to admit either a multi-prior expected
single-utility or a single-prior expected multi-utility representation, where the prize space can
be any compact metric space, are shown. Moreover, in [14], the characterization of multi-prior
expected multi-utility representation, where the price space is not allowed to be Rd but it is a
finite set, is given. Throughout this paper, we consider the multi-prior expected multi-utility
representations of preference relations as given by Definition 2.5. Moreover, the functions
u ∈ U are assumed to be multivariate utility functions defined as follows.
Definition 2.7. A proper concave function u : Rd → R ∪ {±∞} is a multivariate utility
function if u is increasing with respect to the partial order ≤ on Rd.
Remark 2.8. In [7], Campi and Owen define a multivariate utility function in a similar way.
Different from Definition 2.7, they require Cu := cl (domu) to be a convex cone such that
Rd+ ⊆ Cu 6= Rd and u to be increasing with respect to the partial order ≤Cu . Note that as
Cu ⊇ Rd+, our definition is more general.
The preimage of the function u is denoted by u−1, that is, for S ⊆ R we have u−1(S) =
{x ∈ Rd| f(x) ∈ S}. If d = 1 and u is invertible, then u−1(·) corresponds to the inverse
function as usual.
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Assumption 2.9. Throughout, we assume the following.
a. The preference relation admits a multi-prior expected multi-utility representation where
U = {u1, . . . , ur} and Q = {Q1 . . . Qs} for some r, s ≥ 1 with q := rs.
b. U ⊆ C(Rd) and any u ∈ U is a multivariate utility function.
c. Any u ∈ U is strictly increasing in the sense that x < y implies u(x) < u(y).
Remark 2.10. Note that it is also possible to consider the slighly more general preference
relation in [26], where there is a set of probability measure and utility pairs, say, UQ and
Y % Z ⇐⇒ ∀(u,Q) ∈ UQ : EQu(Y ) ≥ EQu(Z).
In this case, we would assume that there exists finitely many pairs in UQ instead of what is
stated in Assumption 2.9a. However, keeping the representation as in Definition 2.5 will be
useful in simplifying some expressions throughout.
3 Certainty Equivalent for Incomplete Preferences
In the classical utility theory, where the preference relation is complete and represented by a
single univariate utility function, the certainty equivalent of a random variable Z is defined
as the deterministic amount which would yield the same utility as the expected utility of Z.
This amount is unique and can be computed if the utility function is bijective.
Under incomplete preferences, there is not necessarily a unique certainty equivalent of a
random variable. In the past literature, usually a candidate with nice properties is picked and
considered as the certainty equivalent. One of the choices is the worst-case (strong) certainty
equivalent when d = 1. If Q is a singleton, i.e., the utility representation is given as a single-
prior expected multi-utility representation, where the utility functions are bijective, then the
strong certainty equivalent of Z is given by infu∈U u−1(Eu(Z)), see [1]. Similarly, one could
consider the weak certainty equivalent, namely, supu∈U u−1(Eu(Z)). Applying the same idea
to an incomplete preference that admits a multi-prior expected multi-utility representation
for d = 1, it is possible to consider the strong and the weak certainty equivalents given by
infQ∈Q,u∈U u−1(EQu(Z)) and supQ∈Q,u∈U u−1(EQu(Z)), respectively. However, it is not clear
if (or how) these strong and weak certainty equivalent concepts generalize to the case where
d > 1 since the preimage u−1 of a multivariate function u yields a subset of Rd instead of a
real number.
As already motivated in Section 1 for a more general setting, we will now present the
most intuitive definition of a certainty equivalent for the case d ≥ 1, but we will see that
this definition does not always provide a meaningful concept. Thus, instead, we will use the
insights from Section 2.3, where we rewrote the scalar indifference prices as the upper and
lower bounds of the set of all buy and sell prices, and we will see that this concept leads to a
more suitable definition of a (weak and strong) certainty equivalent for the case d ≥ 1.
We define the certainty equivalent of a random variable Z ∈ L0(F ,Rd) as a subset of Rd,
d ≥ 1 as follows.
Definition 3.1. The certainty equivalent for Z ∈ L0(F ,Rd) is the set
C (Z) := {c ∈ Rd| c ∼ Z}.
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Let us consider the following sets
Cup (Z) := {c ∈ Rd| c % Z}, Clo (Z) := {c ∈ Rd| Z % c}.
Clearly, we have C (Z) = Cup (Z)∩Clo (Z). Note that it is highly possible that this intersection
is empty as the preference relation is incomplete. In that case, considering Cup (Z) and Clo (Z)
would provide the full information for the decision maker.
When we consider preferences which admit a multi-prior expected multi-utility represen-
tation, under Assumption 2.9, these sets can be written as follows
Cup (Z) = {c ∈ Rd| ∀u ∈ U ,∀Q ∈ Q : u(c) ≥ EQu(Z)}
=
⋂
u∈U
{c ∈ Rd| u(c) ≥ sup
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)};
Clo (Z) = {c ∈ Rd| ∀u ∈ U ,∀Q ∈ Q : u(c) ≤ EQu(Z)}
=
⋂
u∈U
{c ∈ Rd| u(c) ≤ inf
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)};
C (Z) = {c ∈ Rd| ∀u ∈ U ,∀Q ∈ Q : u(c) = EQu(Z)}
=
⋂
u∈U ,Q∈Q
u−1(EQu(Z)).
(4)
Remark 3.2. By continuity of the utility functions u ∈ U , the sets Cup (Z) and Clo (Z) are
closed; by the monotonicity of u ∈ U , Cup (Z) is an upper set and Clo (Z) is a lower set.
Moreover, as u ∈ U are concave, Cup (Z) is a convex set, whereas Clo (Z) is not convex in
general.
Proposition 3.3. Under Assumption 2.9, int C (Z) = ∅ for any Z ∈ L0(F ,Rd).
Proof. Assume the contrary and let c ∈ int C (Z). Then, there exists δ > 0 such that c+ δe ∈
C (Z), where e denotes the vector of ones. By Assumption 2.9 c. and by the definition of
Cup (Z), for all u ∈ U and for all Q ∈ Q, we have
u(c+ δe) > u(c) ≥ EQu(Z).
Hence, for all u ∈ U , it is true that u(c + δe) > infQ∈Q EQu(Z). This implies that c + δe /∈
Clo (Z), which is a contradiction to c+ δe ∈ C (Z).
Note that in many cases C (Z) is an empty set, see e.g. Example 6.1, and thus not a
suitable concept in general. Thus, we will propose an alternative definition that is based on
the insights from Section 2.3 and define the strong and weak certainty equivalents as follows.
Definition 3.4. For Z ∈ L0(F ,Rd), the strong certainty equivalent of Z is Cs (Z) :=
bdClo (Z) and the weak certainty equivalent of Z is Cw (Z) := bdCup (Z).
The following proposition shows the characterizations and interpretations of the strong
and weak certainty equivalents.
Proposition 3.5. Let c ∈ Rd. Then,
1. c ∈ Cw (Z) if and only if
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i. c % Z and
ii. c− ε 6% Z for all ε ∈ intRd+;
2. c ∈ Cs (Z) if and only if
i. Z % c and
ii. Z 6% c+ ε for all ε ∈ intRd+.
Proof. First, note that c % Z holds if and only if u(c) ≥ EQu(Z) for all u ∈ U , Q ∈
Q. Similarly, c − ε 6% Z holds if and only if there exist u˜ ∈ U and Q˜ ∈ Q such that
u˜(c − ε) < EQ˜u˜(Z). Now, by Remark 3.2, Cup (Z) is an upper closed set. Then, Cw (Z) =
bdCup (Z) = wMinCup (Z) and the first assertion follows by the definition of weakly minimal
elements. Symmetrically, the second assertion holds as Clo (Z) is a lower closed set which
implies Cs (Z) = wMaxClo (Z).
In the following two remarks we consider the two special cases d = 1 and U = {u}.
Remark 3.6. If the price space is R, that is, d = 1, we have Cup (Z) = [cw,∞) and Clo =
(−∞, cs] for some cw, cs ∈ R, see Remark 3.2. By Proposition 3.3, we have cs ≤ cw. Moreover,
the utility functions u ∈ U are univariate and since they are strictly increasing, the inverse
function u−1 is well defined. Indeed, by monotonicity of u, it is easy to see that we have
Cs (Z) = inf
u∈U ,Q∈Q
u−1(EQu(Z)) and Cw (Z) = sup
u∈U ,Q∈Q
u−1(EQu(Z)).
Hence, we recover the strong and the weak certainty equivalents as mentioned in the beginning
of Section 3.
When restricted to Q being a singleton, this definition yields the strong certainty equiva-
lent introduced in [1].
Moreover, C (Z) 6= ∅, if and only if c := cw = cs = u−1(EQu(Z)) for all u ∈ U , Q ∈ Q.
In this case, we have C(Z) = {c}. This observation also proves the recovery of the classical
certainty equivalent whenever a complete preference admitting a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility (single-prior expected single-univariate-utility) representation is considered.
Remark 3.7. If the preference relation admits a multi-prior expected single-utility represen-
tation, that is U = {u}, then for any Z ∈ L0(F ,Rd) we have
Cup (Z) = u−1
([
sup
Q∈Q
EQu(Z),∞
))
,
Clo (Z) = u−1
((−∞, inf
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)
])
,
where u−1 is the preimage. Moreover, by the monotonicity and continuity of u it is easy to
see that
Cw (Z) = u−1
(
sup
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)
)
, Cs (Z) = u−1
(
inf
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)
)
.
Note that if the preference relation is complete and admits a single-prior expected single-
utility representation, that is, if Q = {Q} and U = {u}, then we have
C (Z) = Cw (Z) = Cs (Z) = u−1(EQu(Z)).
This suggests that for a complete preference relation represented by a single multivariate
utility function u : Rd → R ∪ {−∞}, the certainty equivalent of Z is defined as the preimage
u−1(EQu(Z)) ⊆ Rd.
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4 Utility Indifference Pricing for Incomplete Preferences
In this section, we consider the indifference pricing problem where the preference relation is
not necessarily complete. In particular, we consider the case where Assumption 2.9 holds.
Following the footsteps of the classical definition, we first consider the ‘utility maximization
problem’ for such representations of the incomplete preferences.
Notation 4.1. We denote the vector-valued expected utility functional by U(·) : L0(F ,Rd)→
Rq, where U(·) := (EQ1u1(·), . . . ,EQ1ur(·), . . . ,EQsu1(·), . . .EQsur(·))T .
If we consider a representation given by a set of probability measures paired with utility
functions as in [26], we would list all the pairs in order to obtain U(·) and all the results of
this section would remain the same, see also Remark 2.10.
Now, under Assumption 2.9, the utility maximization problem can be seen as a vector
optimization problem P (x,CT ) given by
P (x,CT ) : maximize U(Z + CT ) subject to Z ∈ A(x), (5)
whereA(x) ⊆ L0(FT ,Rd) is the set of all wealth that can be generated from initial endowment
x, and CT ∈ L0(FT ,Rd) is some payoff that is received at time T . Note that the ordering cone
for this problem is the positive orthant. This is because an alternative with component-wise
larger expected utility would be preferred by the decision maker.
Throughout, we assume that A(·) satisfies the following.
Assumption 4.2. Let x, y ∈ Rd, λ ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrary.
a. A(x) is a convex set.
b. λA(x)+ (1−λ)A(y) ⊆ A(λx+(1−λ)y), where the set addition and multiplication are the
usual Minkowski operations.
c. If x ≤ y, then A(x) ⊆ A(y).
d. If VT ∈ A(x), then VT + r ∈ A(x+ r) for any r ∈ Rd.
e. Let (xk)k≥1 ∈ Rd be a decreasing sequence with respect to ≤ with limk→∞ xk = x ∈ Rd.
Then, A(x) = ⋂k≥1A(xk).
Two different market models and thus examples for A(x) will be given in Sections 6.1
and 6.2. Note that by Assumption 2.9, u ∈ U are concave, and by Assumption 4.2 a., A(x) is
a convex set. Then, (5) is the negative of the following convex vector optimization problem
minimize − U(Z + CT ) subject to Z ∈ A(x), (6)
and the lower image of (5) is equal to the negative of the upper image of the convex vector
optimization problem given by (6).
As introduced in Section 2.2, there is no single optimal objective value of (5) and we
consider the set of all (weakly) maximal elements of the lower image. The lower image of
problem (5) can be written as the following set-valued function
V (x,CT ) := cl
⋃
VT∈A(x)
(
U(VT + CT )− Rq+
)
. (7)
12
Remark 4.3. Let CT , C˜T ∈ L(FT ,Rd) and x, y ∈ Rd. Then, the following implications hold.
a. Assumption 2.9 b. implies that if CT ≤ C˜T , then V (x,CT ) ⊆ V (x, C˜T );
b. Assumption 2.9 c. implies that if CT < C˜T , then V (x,CT ) ( V (x, C˜T );
c. Assumption 4.2 c. implies that if x ≤ y, then V (x,CT ) ⊆ V (y,CT );
d. Assumption 2.9 c. and Assumption 4.2 d. imply that if x < y, then V (x,CT ) ( V (y,CT ).
To see that, note that Assumption 4.2 d. implies that if x < y, then for all VT ∈ A(x)
there exists V˜T ∈ A(y) such that VT < V˜T .
As in the usual utility indifference pricing theory, we first consider the problems V (x0 −
pb, CT ), V (x0 + p
s,−CT ) and V (x0, 0), where pb, ps ∈ Rd are candidates of indifference buy
and sell prices of the claim CT , respectively. Different from the scalar case, the existence of p
b
and ps that would satisfy V (x0−pb, CT ) = V (x0, 0), respectively V (x0+ps,−CT ) = V (x0, 0),
is not guaranteed. Thus, instead, we will base our definition of the set-valued buy and sell
prices on the reformulation of the scalar indifference price given by (3). In other words, we
consider the set of all prices at which one would prefer buying the claim compared to taking
no action. Similarly, we consider the set of all prices at which selling the claim is preferred
compared to taking no action. Then, the indifference prices will be defined as the boundaries
of those sets.
We suggest that buying the claim CT at price p ∈ Rd is at least as preferred as not buying
it if
Max V (x0, 0) 2 Max V (x0 − p,CT ) (8)
holds. Indeed, as the lower images V (·, ·) are closed lower sets, (8) holds if and only if
V (x0, 0) 2 V (x0 − p,CT ), or equivalently,
V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0) (9)
holds. Similarly, selling CT at price p ∈ Rd is preferred to taking no action if
V (x0 + p,−CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0). (10)
Remark 4.4. By Proposition 2.2, (9) implies that
sup
VT∈A(x0−p)
wTU(VT + CT ) ≥ sup
VT∈A(x0)
wTU(VT ) (11)
holds for all w ∈ Rd+. Moreover, the reverse implication holds if A is a closed set. In this
case, satisfying (11) for all w ∈ Rd+ can be seen as the characterization of (9). A similar
characterization can be written for (10).
We define the set-valued buy and sell prices as follows.
Definition 4.5. The set-valued buy price of CT , P
b(CT ), is the set of all prices p
b ∈ Rd
satisfying (9), and the set-valued sell price of CT , P
s(CT ), is the set of all prices p
s ∈ Rd
satisfying (10). That is,
P b(CT ) := {pb ∈ Rd| V (x0 − pb, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0)},
P s(CT ) := {ps ∈ Rd| V (x0 + ps,−CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0)}.
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Remark 4.6. By the definition, it is true that P b(CT ) = −P s(−CT ). Hence, in Proposi-
tions 4.7 and 4.9, the statements are proven for the set-valued buy price P b(·) only.
Note that the set-valued buy/sell prices defined above are not indifference buy/sell prices.
Indeed, for any element p of P b(CT )/P
s(CT ), it is better for the decision maker to buy/sell
the claim at that price. Hence, one may even call these, set-valued better to buy/sell prices
in order to emphasize this observation. For simplicity, we keep the names as they are.
Below we will show that P b(·) and P s(·) satisfies some properties which are in parallel to
the properties of the scalar buy and sell prices under complete preferences. First, we show that
P b(CT ), P
s(CT ) ⊆ Rd are lower, respectively upper, convex sets for any CT ∈ L0(FT ,Rd).
Furthermore, we show the monotonicity of both price functions as well as the concavity of
P b(·) and the convexity of P s(·) in the sense of set-valued functions. The proof can be found
in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.7. Let Assumptions 2.9 and 4.2 a-c hold.
1. For a claim CT ∈ L(FT ,Rd), P b(CT ) is a convex lower set and P s(CT ) is a convex
upper set.
2. P b(·) and P s(·) are increasing with respect to the partial order ≤, in the sense of set
orders 2 and 4, respectively: For C1T , C
2
T ∈ L(FT ,Rd), if C1T ≤ C2T , then P b(C1T ) 2
P b(C2T ) and P
s(C1T ) 4 P
s(C2T ).
3. P b(·) is concave with respect to 2: For C1T , C2T ∈ L(FT ,Rd) and λ ∈ [0, 1]
λP b(C1T ) + (1− λ)P b(C2T ) 2 P b(CλT ) (12)
holds, where CλT := λC
1
T + (1− λ)C2T . Similarly, P s(·) is convex with respect to 4.
The properties proven in Proposition 4.7 simplify further whenever d = 1. First, note that
P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) are then intervals by Proposition 4.7. Moreover, if the preference relation
is complete and a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility representation is given by u : R →
R∪{−∞}, then one recovers the usual definition and the properties of the indifference prices.
Indeed, P b(CT ), P
s(CT ) simplify to P
b, P s given by (3). Then, supP b(CT ) = bdP
b(CT ) is
the classical utility indifference buy price and inf P s(CT ) = bdP
s(CT ) is the classical utility
indifference sell price. In this case, assertions 2. and 3. of Proposition 4.7 simply recover the
monotonicity and concavity (convexity) of the utility indifference buy (sell) price.
By the following propositions, proofs of which can be found in the Appendix, we show
that under some additional assumptions on the market model, namely Assumptions 4.2 d.
to e., buy and sell prices are closed sets and the intersection of buy and sell prices has no
interior. Then, we define indifference price bounds as the boundaries of the set-valued buy
and sell prices, namely bdP b(CT ) and bdP
s(CT ).
Proposition 4.8. Let Assumptions 2.9 and 4.2 a-d hold. Then, for any CT ∈ L0(FT ,Rd),
the followings hold
1. If p ∈ P b(CT ) ∩ P s(CT ), then V (x0 − p,CT ) = V (x0, 0) = V (x0 + p,−CT );
2. int (P b(CT ) ∩ P s(CT )) = ∅.
Proposition 4.9. Let Assumptions 2.9 and 4.2 hold. For a claim CT ∈ L(FT ,Rd), the
set-valued buy and sell prices P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) are closed subsets of Rd.
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Now as set-valued buy and sell prices are closed convex lower, respectively upper sets that
do not have solid intersection, we define indifference price bounds as the boundaries of these
set-valued prices.
Definition 4.10. The indifference price bounds for CT are bdP
b(CT ) and bdP
s(CT ).
Note that the definition of the indifference price bounds are similar to the definitions of the
strong and weak certainty equivalents in a way that they are boundaries of lower and upper
closed sets, respectively. The following proposition, similar to Proposition 3.5 for strong and
weak certainty equivalents, shows the motivation behind the definition for the indifference
price bounds.
Proposition 4.11. Let Assumptions 4.2 and 2.9 hold. Let p ∈ Rd. Then,
1. p ∈ bdP b(CT ) if and only if the followings hold:
i. V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0);
ii. For any ε ∈ intRd+ it is true that V (x0 − p− ε, CT ) + V (x0, 0);
2. p ∈ bdP s(CT ) if and only if the followings hold:
i. V (x0 + p,−CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0);
ii. For any ε ∈ intRd+ it is true that V (x0 + p− ε,−CT ) + V (x0, 0).
Proof. By Propositions 4.7 and 4.9 we know that P b(CT ) is a lower closed set and P
s(CT ) is
an upper closed set. Hence, wMaxP b(CT ) = bdP
b(CT ) and wMinP
s(CT ) = bdP
s(CT ). The
the assertion follows from the definitions of weakly maximal and weakly minimal elements.
Note that for any p ∈ bdP b(CT ) it holds V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0), that is, buying the
claim at p is at least as preferred as not buying it. Moreover, by Remark 4.4, if A is closed
and the utility maximization problem is bounded, V (x0 − p− ǫ, CT ) + V (x0, 0) implies that
there exists w ∈ Rq+ such that the maximum expected weighted utility is strictly less if one
buys the claim at p+ ǫ, that is,
sup
VT∈A(x0−p−ǫ)
wTU(VT + CT ) < sup
VT∈A(x0)
wTU(VT ).
Similarly, for any p ∈ bdP s(CT ), selling the claim at p is at least as preferred as not selling it.
However, for any ǫ ∈ intRq+, there exists w ∈ Rq+ such that the maximum expected weighted
utility is strictly less if one sells the claim at p− ǫ, that is,
sup
VT∈A(x0+p−ǫ)
wTU(VT − CT ) < sup
VT∈A(x0)
wTU(VT ).
With the next proposition, we show that under some further assumptions on u ∈ U and
A(·), for any p ∈ bdP b(CT ), there exists a weight vector w ∈ Rq+ such that paying p to receive
CT and paying nothing and not having CT have the same maximum expected weighted utility
wTU . The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.12. If each u ∈ U is uniformly continuous and A(x) = x + A(0) for all
x ∈ Rd, then V (x0, 0) * intV (x0 − p,CT ) for any p ∈ bdP b(CT ). Similarly, V (x0, 0) *
intV (x0 + p,−CT ) for any p ∈ bdP s(CT ).
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Proposition 4.12 shows that the boundaries of V (x0, 0) and V (x0−p,CT ) intersect, hence
for p ∈ bdP b(CT ) there exists w ∈ Rq+ such that
sup
VT∈A(x0−p)
wTU(VT + CT ) = sup
VT∈A(x0)
wTU(VT ). (13)
Similarly, if p ∈ bdP s(CT ), then there exists w ∈ Rq+ such that
sup
VT∈A(x0+p)
wTU(VT − CT ) = sup
VT∈A(x0)
wTU(VT ).
Note that the market models explained in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 satisfy the assump-
tion A(x) = x + A(0) for all x ∈ Rd. Moreover, the utility functions that are considered in
Example 6.7 are uniformly continuous.
Remark 4.13. In Definition 4.10, the boundaries of the sets P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) are called
the indifference price bounds for CT . Note that different from the scalar case, for example,
the buyer of claim CT is not really indifferent between ‘paying nothing and not having CT ’
and ‘paying pb ∈ bdP b(CT ) to receive CT ’. However, in the special case of a complete pref-
erence relation with d = 1, these sets reduce to the usual indifference prices. Moreover, when
restricted to the special case of a complete preference relation with d > 1 under the conical
market model, these sets contain the indifference prices as defined in [3], see Section 6.2.1.
Furthermore, for the general case, by Proposition 4.12 and (13), we observe that if p ∈
bdP b(CT ), then a decision maker with a complete preference relation which admits a partic-
ular weighted sum of the vector valued utility, wTU , as its representation, would be indifferent
between the two options.
In economic terms, the sets P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) can be seen as the willingness to pay and
then the boundaries would be the reservation price, which is called the indifference price in
Finance. Thus, we decided to still call bdP b(CT ) and bdP
s(CT ) the indifference price bounds
in analogy to the scalar case, knowing that it does in general not mean being indifferent as
in the classical sense, but more in the sense of Proposition 4.12.
Remark 4.14. In [23], Lo¨hne and Rudloff study the set of all superhedging portfolios for
nume´raire free markets with transactions costs and provide an algorithm to compute it.
Accordingly, for a claim CT , the set of superhedging portfolios is given by
SHP(CT ) := {p ∈ Rd| CT ∈ A(p)}
and the set of all subhedging portfolios for CT is
SubHP(CT ) := −SHP(−CT ).
Note that for d = 1, these sets would be intervals leading to the usual no-arbitrage pricing
interval given by (sup SubHP(CT ), inf SHP (CT )).
If A(0) + A(0) ⊆ A(0), which is the case for the conical market model also considered
in [23], we have
P s(CT ) ⊇ SHP (CT ) and P b(CT ) ⊇ SubHP(CT ). (14)
Indeed, for p ∈ SHP (CT ), we have CT ∈ A(p). By Assumption 4.2 d, and A(0)+A(0) ⊆ A(0),
VT + CT ∈ A(x0 + p) for any VT ∈ A(x0). This implies V (x0, 0) ⊆ V (p,−CT ). To see
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that, let U(VT ) − r ∈ V (x0, 0) for some VT ∈ A(x0), r ∈ Rq+. Note that U(VT ) − r =
U(VT + CT − CT ) − r ∈ V (p,−CT ) as VT + CT ∈ A(x0 + p). The second inclusion can be
shown symmetrically.
It is well known that in incomplete financial markets, superhedging can be quite expensive
and thus the interval or set of no-arbitrage prices can be quite big. Indifference pricing
leads then to smaller price intervals. Equation (14) confirms that this is also the case when
incomplete preference relations are considered. In Examples 6.1, 6.6 and 6.7, the utility
indifference price bounds and for comparison also the super- and subhedging price bounds
will be computed to illustrate the relationship given in (14).
5 Computing the Certainty Equivalent and Indifference Price
Bounds
Before considering different market models and solving numerical examples in Section 6, we
now discuss the computations of the set-valued quantities introduced in Sections 3 and 4.
Note that the computations are related to solving CVOPs and we will show some simpli-
fications for some special cases. First, we discuss computing the certainty equivalent and
then approximations to the indifference price bounds. Numerical examples will be given in
Section 6, see Examples 6.1, 6.6, and 6.7.
5.1 Computing Cup (Z) and Clo (Z)
The computations of Cup (Z) and Clo (Z) for d = 1 are already given by Remark 3.6. Here,
we focus on the d > 1 case only. As stated in Remark 3.2, Cup (Z) is a closed upper set.
Indeed, using the representation given in (4), it is easy to see that Cup (Z) is the upper image
of the following convex vector optimization problem with r constraints:
minimize c
subject to sup
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)− u(c) ≤ 0 for all u ∈ U . (15)
On the other hand, even though it is known by Remark 3.2 that Clo (Z) is a closed lower
set, computing Clo (Z) requires more computational effort than computing Cup (Z), in general.
One can show that Clo (Z) is the lower image of the following vector optimization problem
maximize c
subject to inf
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)− u(c) ≥ 0 for all u ∈ U . (16)
This problem is non-convex if the utility functions are not linear. There are algorithms that
approximately solve non-convex vector optimization problems, see [27]. Instead of solving
one non-convex VOP, one can also solve r convex vector optimization problems in order to
generate Clo (Z). Note that by the continuity of u ∈ U , we have
cl (Rd \ Clo (Z)) =
⋃
u∈U
{c ∈ Rd| u(c) ≥ inf
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)},
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and each set {c ∈ Rd| u(c) ≥ infQ∈Q EQu(Z)} is the upper image of the following vector
optimization problem
minimize c
subject to inf
Q∈Q
EQu(Z)− u(c) ≤ 0. (17)
Then, one needs to solve r convex vector optimization problems (one for each u ∈ U), and
the union of the upper images over all u ∈ U yields cl (Rd \ Clo (Z)).
Note that if the preference relation admits a multi-prior expected single utility repre-
sentation, that is, if r = 1, then clearly it is enough to solve a single CVOP to compute
Clo (Z).
Remark 5.1. If the preference relation admits a single-prior expected-single utility rep-
resentation where U = {u},Q = {Q} and d > 1, see also Remark 3.7, then, Cup (Z) =
cl (Rd \Clo (Z)) and C(Z) is the boundary of the upper image of the following convex vector
optimization problem
minimize c
subject to Eu(Z)− u(c) ≤ 0.
5.2 Computations of the Buy and Sell Price Bounds
It is known by Proposition 4.7 that set-valued buy and sell prices are lower, respectively
upper closed convex sets. The main idea is that these sets can be seen as lower, respectively
upper images of a certain convex vector optimization problem. Then, the aim is to solve these
CVOP’s in order to find inner and outer approximations to the set-valued buy and sell prices.
The first step is to solve the utility maximization problem (5) for CT = 0 and x = x0 using
a CVOP algorithm to obtain an inner and an outer approximation to the lower image V (x0, 0)
of problem (5) as defined in (7). Note that for bounded problems, the primal as well as the
dual algorithm provided in [24] yields a finite weak ǫ-solution X¯ = {X1, . . . ,X l} ⊆ A(x0)
of P (x0, 0) defined in (5) in the sense of Definition 2.1. Hence, it is true that
convU(X¯ )− Rq+ ⊆ V (x0, 0) ⊆ convU(X¯ )− Rq+ + ǫk, (18)
where ǫ > 0 is the approximation error bound and k ∈ intRq+ is fixed.
Moreover, by the structure of these algorithms, Xi ∈ X¯ is an optimal solution of the
weighted sum scalarization problem for some wi ∈ Rd+, that is,
(wi)TU(Xi) = max
VT∈A(x0)
(wi)TU(VT ) =: v
wi .
The algorithms in [24] also provide these weight vectors wi ∈ Rd+ for Xi ∈ X¯ , see also Re-
mark 2.4. Let the finite set of weight vectors provided by the algorithm beW := {w1, . . . , wl}.
In the following two sections, we provide methods to compute a superset and a subset of
P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) using such a finite weak ǫ-solution X¯ as well as the finite set of weight
vectors W .
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5.2.1 Computing a Superset of P b(CT ) and P
s(CT )
If A(·) is a closed set, then by Remark 4.4, the set of all buy prices for a claim CT ∈ L(FT ,Rd)
can be written as
P b(CT ) = {p ∈ Rd| V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0)}
= {p ∈ Rd| ∀w ∈ Rq+ : sup
VT∈A(x0−p)
wTU(VT + CT ) ≥ vw}, (19)
where vw = supVT∈A(x0) w
TU(VT ).
Note that finding the values vw for all w ∈ Rq+ may not be possible in general. However,
by the aforementioned approximation algorithms, we obtain a ‘representative’ setW of weight
vectors. Then, clearly,
P bout(CT ) := {p ∈ Rd| ∀w ∈W : sup
VT∈A(x0−p)
(w)TU(VT + CT ) ≥ vw}
is a superset of P b(CT ). Moreover, P
b
out(CT ) is the lower image of the following convex vector
optimization problem:
maximize p (20)
subject to (wi)TU(V iT + CT ) ≥ vw
i
;
V iT ∈ A(x0 − p) for i = 1, . . . , l.
In general it is not known if this CVOP is bounded or not. In some cases, it is possible to
formulate the problem as a bounded CVOP using an ordering cone different from Rd+. In
Section 6.2, we consider a special case where the ordering cone is enlarged in order to solve
problem (20) using the algorithms provided in [24].
Using similar arguments one can show that the upper image of the following CVOP gives
a superset P sout(CT ) to P
s(CT ):
minimize p (21)
subject to (wi)TU(V iT − CT ) ≥ vw
i
;
V iT ∈ A(x0 + p) for i = 1, . . . , l.
5.2.2 Computing a Subset of P b(CT ) and P
s(CT )
By Remark 2.4, a finite weak ǫ-solution X¯ = {X1, . . . ,X l} of (5) provides an outer approxi-
mation of V (x0, 0) given by Vout(x0, 0) := convU(X¯ )−Rq+ + ǫ{k}, where k ∈ intRq+ is fixed.
Then,
P bin(CT ) := {p ∈ Rd| ∀i = 1, . . . , l : ∃V iT ∈ A(x0 − p) : U(V iT + CT ) ≥ U(Xi) + ǫk}
is a subset of P b(CT ). To see that, let p ∈ P bin(CT ), that is, for all i = 1, . . . , l, there exist
V iT ∈ A(x0 − p) such that U(V iT + CT ) ≥ U(Xi) + ǫk. Note that it is enough to show
V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ convU(X¯ )− Rq+ + ǫ{k} as this implies V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0) and hence
p ∈ P b(CT ). Let u¯ ∈ convU(X¯ ) be arbitrary. Then, there exist αi ≥ 0 with
∑l
i=1 αi = 1
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such that u¯ =
∑l
i=1 αiU(X
i). Note that V αT :=
∑l
i=1 αiV
i
T ∈ A(x0 − p) by the convexity of
A(x0−p). Also, as the utility functional is concave we have U(V αT +CT ) ≥
∑l
i=1 αiU(V
i
T+CT )
and hence, U(V αT +CT ) ≥ u¯+ ǫk. Since for any u¯ ∈ convU(X¯ ), there exists V αT ∈ A(x0 − p)
such that U(V αT + CT ) ≥ u¯+ ǫk, V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ convU(X¯ )− Rq+ + ǫ{k} holds.
P bin(CT ) is the lower image of the following convex vector optimization problem:
maximize p (22)
subject to U(V iT + CT ) ≥ U(Xi) + ǫk;
V iT ∈ A(x0 − p) for i = 1, . . . , l.
Using similar arguments one can show that the upper image P sin(CT ) of the following
CVOP is a subset of P s(CT ):
minimize p (23)
subject to U(V iT − CT ) ≥ U(Xi) + ǫk;
V iT ∈ A(x0 + p) for i = 1, . . . , l.
Remark 5.2. It is possible that problems (22) and (23) are infeasible when the error bound
ǫ in (18) is not small enough, see Example 6.1. Thus, even though P bin(CT ) and P
s
in(CT ) are
subsets of the set-valued buy and sell prices respectively, they could be empty sets. As it is
not possible to determine the approximation error at this time, we do not call these sets outer
or inner approximations, but rather sub- and supersets of P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ). However, we
will see that in the numerical examples of Sections 6.1 and 6.2, these sub- and supersets will
approximate the set-valued prices rather well.
Remark 5.3. Note that solving the optimization problems (20), (21), (22) and (23), one
obtains a set of hedge positions V iT , i = 1, . . . , l. In practice, the decision maker could pick
any of these efficient hedge positions as the vector valued expected utilities they provide are
all maximal and they can not be compared with each other.
5.2.3 Remarks on Computations in Some Special Cases
Remark 5.4. For d = 1, (20), (21), (22) and (23) are scalar convex programs. In this case,
P bout/in(CT ) = (−∞, pbout/in] and P sout/in(CT ) = [psout/in,∞), where pbout, psout, pbin and psin are
the optimal objective values of (20), (21), (22) and (23), respectively.
Remark 5.5. For d ≥ 1 and a complete preference relation which admits a single-prior
single-utility representation (with utility function u), the set of buy prices P b(CT ) can be
simplified to
P b(CT ) = {p ∈ Rd | sup
VT∈A(x0−p)
Eu(VT + CT ) ≥ v0},
where v0 = supVT∈A(x0) Eu(VT ). Note that this is the lower image of the following convex
vector optimization problem:
maximize p (24)
subject to Eu(VT + CT ) ≥ v0
VT ∈ A(x0 − p).
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Similarly, P s(CT ) is the upper image of the following vector minimization problem
minimize p
subject to Eu(VT − CT ) ≥ v0
VT ∈ A(x0 + p).
Thus, in the case of a complete preference relation and d ≥ 1, it is not necessary to compute
sub- and supersets of P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) as the set-valued prices P
b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) are
upper respectively lower images of vector optimization problems itself.
6 Special Cases and Numerical Examples
We consider two different market models in this Section. The first one is an incomplete
market where d = 1 and the utility functions are univariate. In this setting, we consider an
incomplete preference relation represented by multiple utility functions. The second one is
the conical market model where d > 1 and the utility functions are multivariate. Under this
setting, we consider two different cases: a complete preference that is represented by a single
multivariate utility function as in [3], and an incomplete preference relation represented by
component-wise utility functions as in [16].
6.1 An Example with Univariate Utility Functions
Consider a probability space (Ω,FT ,P) where Ω = {ωj, j = 1, . . . , 2n} and FT = 2Ω. Consider
a single period model in a market consisting of one riskless and n risky assets. The interest
rate is assumed to be zero. Only m < n of the risky assets can be traded. Assume the traded
assets are indexed by 1, . . . ,m. The current value of the traded and non-traded risky assets
are Si0 for i = 1, . . . , n. At time T , the value of the traded and the non-traded assets are
SiT = S
i
0ξ
i, where ξi, i = 1, . . . , n are FT measurable random variables. Let St be the vector
of values of traded assets at time t, that is, St = [S
1
t , . . . , S
m
t ]
T for t = 0, T .
We consider a portfolio consisting of α ∈ Rm shares of the traded assets and an amount
β = x0 − αTS0 invested in the riskless asset, where x0 is the initial endowment. Then, the
wealth at the end of the period [0, T ] is given by VT = x0 + α
T (ST − S0). The set of wealth
that can be generated with the initial endowment x0 is
A(x0) = {VT ∈ L0(FT ,R)| ∃α ∈ Rm : VT ≤ x0 + αT (ST − S0)},
which satisfies Assumption 4.2 a.-d.
In this setting, we consider a claim (that may depend on the traded as well as on the non-
traded assets), yielding a payoff CT at time T . We assume that there is a decision making
committee consisting of q individuals and the incomplete preference relation has a single-prior
multi-utility representation. More precisely, assume that Q = {P} and U = {u1, . . . , uq} are
such that Assumption 2.9 is satisfied.
By Remark 3.6, the weak and the strong certainty equivalents of CT in this setting are
Cw (CT ) = {cw } and Cs (CT ) = {cs } with
cw = inf
i=1,...,q
{u−1i (Eui(CT ))} and cs = sup
i=1,...,q
{u−1i (Eui(CT ))}.
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Note that the market in consideration is incomplete, hence there is no unique complete
market price. Instead, one could consider the no-arbitrage price bounds, which is nothing
but the sub- and superhedging prices. However, these price bounds can be quite large for
practical use, see also Remark 4.14. For the numerical example below, we compute both no-
arbitrage price bounds and utility indifference price bounds to illustrate that the indifference
price bounds provide a narrower interval.
In order to compute the indifference price bounds, we consider the utility maximization
problem P (x0, 0) in (5), which can be formulated as
max
α∈Rm
U(x0 + α
T (ST − S0)).
The set-valued buy and sell prices satisfy intP b(CT ) = (−∞, pb) and intP s(CT ) = (ps,∞),
where pb and ps are the indifference price bounds. Note that as Assumption 4.2 (e) may not
be satisfied, one can not guarantee the closedness of the set-valued prices under this setting.
The outer and inner approximations to the set-valued prices, P bout/in(CT ) = (−∞, pbout/in] and
P sout/in(CT ) = [p
s
out/in,∞), where pbin ≤ pb ≤ pbout and psout ≤ ps ≤ psin, can be computed as it
is explained in Remark 5.4. Below we provide a numerical example.
Example 6.1. Let n = 2,m = 1, x0 = 10, S0 = [4 6]
T , P(ωi) = 0.25 for i = 1, . . . , 4 and
ξ1(ω1) = ξ
1(ω2) =
5
2
, ξ1(ω3) = ξ
1(ω4) =
1
2
, ξ2(ω1) = ξ
2(ω3) =
4
3
, ξ2(ω2) = ξ
2(ω4) =
2
3
.
Assume that U = {u1, u2} where u1(x) = 1 − e−x, and u2(x) = log(x+1010 ) and let CT =∑2
i=1 S
i
T . First, as described above, we find the weak and the strong certainty equivalents of
the payoff as cw = 11.0889 and cs = 7.3678, which also shows that the certainty equivalent
as given in Definition 3.1 is empty. Then, we employ the dual algorithm proposed in [24] to
obtain an approximation (with an error bound ǫ = 10−8) to the lower image of the utility
maximization problem and the corresponding set of weight vectors W as well as vw for each
w ∈W . The inner approximation of the lower image V (x0, 0) can be seen in Figure 1. When
we solve the utility maximization problem, it also gives a subset of hedge positions that would
yield maximal expected utilities. The expected utilities that can be generated by these hedge
positions are marked on the boundary of the lower image V (x0, 0).
After solving the utility maximization problem, we solve the single objective convex pro-
grams (20)-(23) to compute pbin = 8.6747, p
b
out = 8.6750 and p
s
out = 11.3250, p
s
in = 11.3253.
Similar to the utility maximization problem, when we solve these single optimization problems
in order to find the price bounds, they also return a set of hedge positions which would yield
maximal utilities that can be generated if the price is set accordingly. In Figure 1, we also plot
the lower image V (x0−pbout, CT ) of the corresponding utility maximization problem when the
buy price is set to pbout = 8.6750. As expected, V (x0 − pbout, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0). The markers on
the boundary of V (x0 − pbout, CT ) shows the expected utilities that can be generated by the
hedge positions that are found by solving this utility maximization problem.
For this example, the set of all superhedging and subhedging portfolios can be computed
easily as SHP (CT ) = [12,∞) and SubHP(CT ) = (−∞, 8], see Remark 4.14. In Figure 1,
we plot the lower image V (x0 − psub, CT ) of the corresponding utility maximization problem
when the buy price is set to the subhedging price, psub = 8. As before the markers on
the boundary of V (x0 − psub, CT ) shows the expected utilities that can be generated by the
hedge positions that are found by solving this utility maximization problem. We observe that
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Figure 1: The inner approximation of the lower image V (x0, 0) of problem P (x0, 0) in (5)
from Example 6.1.
V (x0 − psub, CT ) ⊇ V (x0 − pbout, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0) as expected. This illustrates that the buyer
is still willing to buy the claim even if the price is higher than the subhedging price as the
expected utility that he can generate is still greater than the expected utility that can be
generated without buying the claim.
We compute pbout/in and p
s
out/in for different ǫ values. For this example we observe that the
outer approximations are tight even for large ǫ values. Indeed, it holds that pbout = 8.6750 and
psout = 11.3250 for all ǫ values listed in Table 1. However, the inner approximations improve
significantly as ǫ gets smaller. Below, we provide pbin, p
s
in as well as the differences p
b
out − pbin
and psin − psout. Note that for large ǫ, problems (22) and (23) turn out to be infeasible.
Table 1: Inner and Outer Approximations for pb and ps for Example 6.1
ǫ pbin p
s
in p
b
out − pbin psin − psout
10−4 −∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
10−5 8.3859 11.6141 0.2891 0.2891
10−6 8.6496 11.3504 0.0254 0.0254
10−7 8.6725 11.3275 0.0025 0.0025
10−8 8.6747 11.3253 2.2134 × 10−4 2.3590 × 10−4
6.2 Conical Market Models and Multivariate Utility Functions
In this Section, we consider conical market models, where we have d > 1. In Section 6.2.1 we
study an example of a complete preference relation given by a multivariate utility function
and in Section 6.2.2 we consider an example of an incomplete preference relation.
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Throughout this Section, consider a financial market consisting of d currencies, which can
be traded over discrete time t = 0, 1, ..., T . Let (Ω,F , (F)Tt=0,P) be a filtered finite probabil-
ity space. A portfolio vector at time t is an Ft measurable random vector Vt, where the ith
coordinate denotes the amount of money in currency i at time t. Note that we do not fix a
reference currency as a nume´raire, instead all currencies are symmetrically treated.
For a market with proportional transaction costs, one models the market with a stochastic
process Kt of solvency cones. A solvency cone Kt is a polyhedral convex cone with Rd+ ( Kt 6=
Rd, and it denotes all positions in the d currencies that can be traded to the zero portfolio by
either exchanging or discarding currencies at time t. In other words, the generating vectors of
Kt are given by the bid-ask prices between any two currencies at time t. For this market, an
Rd-valued process, (Vt)Tt=0 is called a self-financing portfolio process, if (Vt) is adapted and
satisfies
Vt − Vt−1 ∈ −Kt, P-a.s., for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., T}
with V−1 = 0.
We consider the linear space of all Ft-measurable Rd-valued random vectors L0d(Ft,Rd).
The set of all such vectors with values that are P-a.s. in Kt is denoted by L0d(Ft,Kt). Fur-
thermore, AT ⊆ L0d(FT ,Rn) denotes the set of all random vectors VT , which are the values of
a self-financing portfolio at time T . By definition of self financing processes, we have
AT = −L0d(F0,K0)− L0d(F1,K1)− . . .− L0d(FT ,KT ). (25)
Note that AT is the set of superhedgeable claims starting from initial endowment 0 ∈ Rd at
time zero. Clearly, A(x0) := x0 +AT is the set of all random vectors, which are the value of
a self-financing portfolio at time T , where the initial endowment is x0 ∈ Rd at time t = 0.
Remark 6.2. Note that A(·) described above satisfies Assumption 4.2 as we will see in the
following. Moreover, it satisfies a stronger monotonicity property given by
b˜. If x ≤K0 y, then A(x) ⊆ A(y).
To see that, let x ≤K0 y, then
A(x) = x− L0d(F0,K0)− L0d(F1,K1)− . . . − L0d(FT ,KT )
= y − (y − x)− L0d(F0,K0)− L0d(F1,K1)− . . .− L0d(FT ,KT )
⊆ y − L0d(F0,K0)− L0d(F1,K1)− . . .− L0d(FT ,KT )
= A(y),
where we used the fact that y − x ∈ K0.
Clearly, property b˜. implies Assumption 4.2 b. as Rq+ ⊆ K0. Also, using the convexity
of Kt and L
0
d(Ft,Kt), for t = 0, . . . , T , and by definition of A(·), it is easy to see that
Assumption 4.2 a., c. and d. hold. Finally, if AT is closed, then Assumption 4.2 e. also holds.
Note that AT is closed under the standard no arbitrage assumptions, see for instance [20].
Remark 6.3. For conical market models, in addition to Proposition 4.7, P b(CT ), P
s(CT )
satisfy also the following properties:
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a. P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ) are convex lower, respectively upper, sets with respect to ≤K0 .
b. P b(·) and P s(·) are increasing with respect to the partial order ≤, in the sense of set orders
2K0 and 4K0 , respectively: For C
1
T , C
2
T ∈ L(FT ,Rd), if C1T ≤ C2T , then P b(C1T ) 2K0
P b(C2T ) and P
s(C1T ) 4K0 P
s(C2T ).
These can be shown using the fact that A(x) satisfies the additional property b˜. given in
Remark 6.2.
By Remark 6.3 a., since K0 ) Rd+, the optimization problems (20), (21) are not (and (22)
and (23) may not be) bounded in the sense of vector optimization when the ordering cones
of these problems is set as Rd+. Since the algorithms provided [24] work only for bounded
convex vector optimization problems, and since property b˜. and the properties in Remark 6.3
are satisfied, one can set the ordering cones of these problems to be K0 in a model with
proportional transaction costs. In general, one still can not guarantee that these problems
are bounded with respect to these extended ordering cones. However, the algorithms in [24]
can determine if the problem is unbounded or bounded and solves it in case it is bounded. In
the numerical examples considered below, the problems will turn out to be indeed bounded
with respect to K0.
We will now consider two special cases in this market model. First, a complete preference
relation represented by a single multivariate utility function is used. Then, we consider an
incomplete preference relation represented by a single-prior multi-utility representation where
the multivariate utility functions are defined component-wise.
6.2.1 A Single Multivariate Utility Function Case
We consider a conical market model as described above and assume that the preference
relation is complete and represented by a single multivariate utility function u, as discussed
in Remark 5.5.
Indifference pricing with a multivariate utility function, where proportional transaction
costs are modeled by solvency cones, has also been studied by Benedetti and Campi in [3].
They consider a continuous time setting where the probability space is not necessarily finite.
Accordingly, they have further assumptions on the multivariate utility function. The utility
indifference buy price pbj ∈ R of a claim CT ∈ L(FT ,Rd) in terms of currency j ∈ {1, . . . , d}
is defined in [3] as a solution to
sup
VT∈A(x0−ejpbj)
Eu(VT + CT ) = v
0, (26)
where v0 := supVT∈A(x0) Eu(VT ) and ej ∈ Rd is the unit vector with only jth component being
nonzero. It has been shown in [3] that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, pbj ∈ R exists uniquely.
We will now show that the utility indifference buy price pbj defined in [3] is contained on
the boundary of the set-valued buy price bdP b(CT ) defined here. Thus, p
b
j can be seen as
a special case if one is only interested in the price expressed in currency i. However, the
set-valued prices also allow for situations in which the buyer (or seller) has capital in several
currencies, see also Remark 6.5 below. Then, it would be more expensive, if one would need
to exchange that portfolio into a particular currency to buy the claim at price pbj because of
the transaction costs involved. Let us now show the relation between pbj and P
b(CT ).
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First note that pbj is the optimal objective value of the scalar convex program given by
maximize p
subject to Eu(VT + CT ) ≥ v0 (27)
VT ∈ A(x0 − pej),
which is equivalent to solving
maximize pj
subject to Eu(VT + CT ) ≥ v0 (28)
VT ∈ A(x0 − p)
pi ≥ 0 for i 6= j
in the following sense: If p1 ∈ R, V 1T ∈ A(x0 − p1ej) is optimal for (27), then p = p1ej ∈
Rd, V 1T ∈ A(x0 − p1ej) is optimal for (28). On the other hand, if p2 ∈ Rd, VT ∈ A(x0 − p2) is
optimal for (28), then p2j ∈ R, VT ∈ A(x0 − p2jej) is optimal for (27). Note that the epigraph
form of (28) is
maximize ρ
subject to Eu(VT + CT ) ≥ v0
VT ∈ A(x0 − p)
p ≥ ρej ,
which is the Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization of the vector optimization problem (24) provided
in Remark 5.5 with reference point v = 0 ∈ Rd and direction d = ej . Then, by Proposition 2.3,
a solution of the scalarization problem is a weak minimizer for the vector optimization problem
given by (24). Thus, pbj corresponds to the point on the boundary of P
b(CT ) that provides
the utility indifference buy price in currency j.
The utility indifference sell price psj of CT in terms of currency j is defined similarly
and can in total analogy be computed by solving a convex program which is equivalent to a
Pascoletti-Serafini scalarization of the corresponding vector problem.
With these observations, we conclude that the set-valued buy and sell prices for multi-
variate utility functions as described in Remark 5.5 contain the real-valued utility indifference
buy and sell prices in terms of a fixed currency as defined by Benedetti and Campi in [3] in
the sense that pbjej ∈ bdP b(CT ) and psjej ∈ bdP s(CT ).
Remark 6.4. There are many different scalarization approaches for vector optimization. The
particular scalarization described above yield buy and sell prices in terms of a single currency.
However, depending on the situation one could consider different scalarizations to compute a
vector-valued price bound on the boundary of P b(·) or P s(·). Indeed, for practice it might be
sufficient to obtain a single (or finitely many) vector-valued price bound(s) by solving single
objective optimization problem(s) instead of solving a vector optimization problem.
Remark 6.5. Remark 6.4 can even be extended in many different ways. For example, assume
there is a potential buyer and a potential seller for a certain payoff CT with multivariate utility
functions ub, us, and initial endowment vectors xb, xs in the d currencies, respectively. In order
to decide if there would be a trade between them, one could check if the set-valued buy price
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of the buyer and the set-valued sell price of the seller have a nonempty intersection. For this,
one needs to compute vb := supVT∈A(xb) Eu
b(VT ) and v
s := supVT∈A(xs) Eu
s(VT ) first. Then,
the buy and sell prices are
P b(CT ) = {p ∈ Rd | sup
VT∈A(xb−p)
Eub(VT + CT ) ≥ vb},
P s(CT ) = {p ∈ Rd | sup
VT∈A(xs+p)
Eus(VT − CT ) ≥ vs}.
In order to check if these sets have a nonempty intersection, one way is to minimize the
distance between them by solving the following single objective problem:
minimize
∥∥∥pb − ps∥∥∥
subject to Eub(V bT − CT ) ≥ vb,
Eus(V sT + CT ) ≥ vs,
V bT ∈ A(xb − pb),
V sT ∈ A(xs + ps).
If the objective function value is zero, then the optimal solution yields a vector-valued buy/sell
price pb = ps as well as the trading strategies for the buyer and the seller.
Example 6.6. Consider a financial market with d = 2 currencies which can be traded over
a single time period. The probability space at terminal time T > 0 is given by (Ω,FT ,P)
with Ω = {ω1, ω2}, FT = 2Ω and pi = P(ωi) = 12 for i = 1, 2. The generating vectors of the
solvency cones K0,K1(ω1) and K1(ω2) are given by the columns of the matrices
K0 =
[
1 −0.9
−0.9 1
]
, K
(1)
1 =
[
2 −1.9
−1 1
]
and K
(2)
1 =
[
1 −1
−2 2.1
]
,
respectively. Assume that the initial position is x0 = 0 ∈ R2. We consider a payoff CT
given by CT (ω1) = [1 0]
T , and CT (ω2) = [0 1]
T and a multivariate utility function given by
u(x) = 1− 0.5(e−x1 + e−x2).
First, we compute the certainty equivalent of CT under the preference relation represented
by the utility function u. This can be done as explained in Remark 5.1, but for this example
it is also possible to compute it analytically. Indeed, C (CT ) is nothing but the indifference
curve for u(x) computed at u(x) = Eu(CT ) = 12(1 − e−1). Also, in this example C (CT ) =
Cw (CT ) = C
s (CT ). Figure 2 shows C
up (CT ),C
lo (CT ) and C (CT ).
In order to compute the set-valued buy and sell prices, first we find v0 as the optimal objective
value of the utility maximization problem P (x0, 0) given in (5), which can be formulated as
follows
maximize
2∑
i=1
piu
(
x0 − (K0α)T − (K(i)1 βi)T
)
subject to α, β1, β2 ≥ 0.
Clearly, the feasible region is closed and the problem is bounded as the utility function is
bounded. Then, as described in Remark 5.5, we compute the set-valued buy and sell prices
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Figure 2: C (CT ) = C
s (CT ) = C
w (CT ) (black line), C
up (CT ) (blue), C
lo (CT ) (green) for
Example 6.6.
using the dual convex Benson algorithm from [24] with error bound ǫ = 10−5. In addition, we
compute the set of all superhedging and subhedging portfolios, see Remark 4.14. Note that
SubHP(CT ) and SHP(CT ) can be computed exactly by solving linear vector optimization
problems, see [23]. The scalar buy and sell prices as defined in [3] are also computed. Figure 3
shows the set-valued buy and sell prices, the superhedging and subhedging portfolios and the
scalar prices in terms of the corresponding currency. As it can be seen from the figure, the
scalar buy and sell prices as in [3] are points on the boundary of the buy and sell prices
where one component is fixed at zero as expected. Moreover, SubHP(CT ) ⊆ P b(CT ) and
SHP (CT ) ⊆ P s(CT ) as it was proven in Remark 4.14.
In order to illustrate the use of the proposed set valued prices compared to the scalar
indifference prices as well as the sub/superhedging portfolios, we consider the following sce-
nario. Assume that a possible buyer in this set up has the position (0.2, 0.45)T at time zero.
It can be seen from Figure 3 that this is in P b(CT ) but not in SubHP(CT ). Hence, this
decision maker would not buy the claim if she considers the subhedging portfolios. However,
she would buy it considering the utility that can be generated as buying the claim would
yield more expected utility than not buying it. Moreover, if the prices are given in terms of
a single currency as in [3], then, in order to buy the claim, she needs to trade her position to
the first or the second currency using the bid-ask prices provided at time zero (K0). Notice
that she can generate at most 0.605 in the first currency or 0.63 in the second currency at
time zero. Since 0.605 < 0.6487 = pb1 and 0.63 < 0.6622 = p
b
2 the decision maker can not buy
the claim at these scalar prices. In other words, buying the claim at a vector valued price,
she is able to generate a higher utility than not buying it; however, if she has to trade at time
zero in order to buy the claim at a scalar price, she can not anymore exchange her position
into sufficient capital to buy it.
6.2.2 Component-wise Utility Functions Case
Under the conical market model described above, we consider a component-wise utility repre-
sentation as in [16], where the utility function of each currency is considered separately. More
specifically, we consider a single-prior multi-utility representation with U = {u¯1, . . . , u¯d},
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Figure 3: Set-valued buy price P b(CT ) (dark green) and sell price P
s(CT ) (dark blue); set
of all subhedging portfolios SubHP(CT ) (light green) and superhedging portfolios SHP (CT )
(light blue); scalar buy and sell prices pb1 = 0.6487, p
b
2 = 0.6622, p
s
1 = 0.6846, p
s
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(black marks) for Example 6.6.
where u¯i : Rd → R ∪ {−∞} is in the form of u¯i(x) = ui(xi) for some univariate utility func-
tion ui : R→ R ∪ {−∞}. Clearly, ui is increasing with respect to ≤ as u¯i is increasing on its
domain and u¯i is proper concave as ui also is. Thus, u¯
i is a multivariate utility function.
Under this setting, the sets Cup (Z) and Clo (Z) for some Z ∈ L0(F ,Rd) simplify to
Cup (Z) = {c ∈ Rd| ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d} : ui(ci) ≥ Eui(Zi)} = c˜+ Rd+,
Clo (Z) = {c ∈ Rd| ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , d} : ui(ci) ≤ Eui(Zi)} = c˜− Rd+,
where c˜ := (u−11 (Eu1(Z1)), . . . , u
−1
d (Eud(Zd))). Hence, the certainty equivalent of Z is a
singleton, namely, C (Z) = {c˜}. Moreover, the strong and the weak certainty equivalents are
the boundaries of Clo (Z) and Cup (Z), respectively.
Even though the certainty equivalent has a much simpler form, the buy and sell prices do
not necessarily simplify and one needs to compute the outer and inner sets as described in
Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.
Below we provide an illustrative numerical example.
Example 6.7. Consider the same market model and payoff CT as in Example 6.6. The scalar
utility functions are given by ui(xi) = 1−e−xi , xi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. The certainty equivalent of
CT under this utility representation is computed as (0.3799, 0.3799)
T ∈ R2. Figure 4 shows
Cup (CT ),C
lo (CT ),C
w (CT ),C
s (CT ) and C (CT ).
The utility maximization problem P (x0, 0) in (5) can be written as
maximize
2∑
i=1
piu
(
x0 − (K0α)T − (K(i)1 βi)T
)
subject to α, β1, β2 ≥ 0,
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Figure 4: C (CT ) (black mark), C
up (CT ) (blue), C
lo (CT ) (green), C
s (CT ) (dark blue line),
and Cw (CT ) (dark green line) for Example 6.7.
where u = [u1 u2]
T .
Clearly, the feasible region is closed and the problem is bounded as the utility functions are
bounded. Hence, the indifference price bounds can be computed as explained in Section 5.2.
The error bound is taken as ǫ = 10−4. Below one can see P b(CT ) and P s(CT ) as well as
SHP (CT ) and SubHP(CT ), which are the same as in Example 6.6. Note that we compute the
supersets and subsets of P b(CT ) and P
s(CT ). It is not possible to distinguish the boundaries
of the inner and outer sets in the figure as they are very close to each other.
A Appendix: Proof of the results from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.7. 1. We first show that P b(CT ) is a lower set, that is, P
b(CT ) =
P b(CT ) − Rd+. It is clear that P b(CT ) ⊆ P b(CT ) − Rd+. To show the reverse inclusion,
let pb ∈ P b(CT ) and r ∈ Rd+. By Assumption 4.2 c., A(x0 − pb + r) ⊇ A(x0 − pb).
Then, by definition of V (·, ·) and since pb ∈ P b(CT ), we have V (x0 − pp + r, CT ) ⊇
V (x0 − pb, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0). Thus, pb − r ∈ P b(CT ).
Next we show that P b(CT ) ⊆ Rd is a convex set. Let p1, p2 ∈ P b(CT ), λ ∈ [0, 1] and
pλ := λp1 + (1 − λ)p2. First, note that V (x0 − pi, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0) for i = 1, 2 implies
that
λV (x0 − p1, CT ) + (1− λ)V (x0 − p2, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0).
In order to show pλ ∈ P b(CT ), it would be enough to prove
V (x0 − pλ, CT ) ⊇ λV (x0 − p1, CT ) + (1− λ)V (x0 − p2, CT ). (29)
Consider U(V iT )− ri ∈ V (x0 − pi, CT ), where V iT ∈ A(x0 − pi) and ri ∈ Rq+ for i = 1, 2.
By concavity of u ∈ U , we have
λU(V 1T + CT ) + (1− λ)U(V 2T +CT ) ≤ U(λV 1T + (1− λ)V 2T + CT ).
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Figure 5: Set-valued buy price P b(CT ) (dark green) and sell price P
s(CT ) (dark blue); set
of all subhedging portfolios SubHP(CT ) (light green) and superhedging portfolios SHP (CT )
(light blue) for Example 6.7.
Clearly,
λU(V 1T + CT ) + (1− λ)U(V 2T + CT )− rλ = U(λV 1T + (1− λ)V 2T + CT )− rλ − r˜
holds for some r˜ ∈ Rq+, where rλ = λr1 + (1− λ)r2. As λV 1T + (1 − λ)V 2T ∈ A(x0 − pλ)
by Assumption 4.2 b., we have
U(λV 1T + (1− λ)V 2T + CT )− rλ − r˜ ∈ V (x0 − pλ, CT ),
which implies (29).
2. We show that P b(·) is monotone with respect to ≤ and 2. Let C1T , C2T ∈ L(F ,Rd) with
C1T ≤ C2T and pb ∈ P b(C1T ). Then, by Remark 4.3 a., and by the definition of P b(·) we
have
V (x0 − pb, C2T ) ⊇ V (x0 − pb, C1T ) ⊇ V (x0, 0).
This concludes that P b(C1T ) ⊆ P b(C2T ), which implies P b(C1T ) 2 P b(C2T ).
3. We show λP b(C1T ) + (1 − λ)P b(C2T ) ⊆ P b(CλT ), which implies (12). Let pi ∈ P b(CiT ),
that is, V (x0, 0) ⊆ V (x0 − pi, CiT ) for i = 1, 2. Clearly,
V (x0, 0) ⊆ λV (x0 − p1, C1T ) + (1− λ)V (x0 − p2, C2T ).
Then, it would be enough to show that
λV (x0 − p1, C1T ) + (1− λ)V (x0 − p2, C2T ) ⊆ V (x0 − pλ, CλT ), (30)
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where pλ := λp1 + (1 − λ)p2. Let V iT ∈ A(x0 − pi) and ri ∈ Rq+ for i = 1, 2. By the
concavity of U(·), we have
λ(U(V 1T + C
1
T )− r1) + (1− λ)(U(V 2T + C2T )− r2)
= λU(V 1T + C
1
T ) + (1− λ)U(V 2T + C2T )− rλ
= U(λV 1T + (1− λ)V 2T +CλT )− rλ − r˜
for some r˜ ∈ Rq+, where rλ := λr1+(1−λ)r2. Note that λV 1T +(1− λ)V 2T ∈ A(x0− pλ)
by Assumption 4.2 b. Then,
λ(U(V 1T + C
1
T )− r1) + (1− λ)(U(V 2T +C2T )− r2) ∈ V (x0 − pλ, CTλ ),
which implies (30).
Proof of Proposition 4.8. 1. Let p ∈ P b(CT ) ∩ P s(CT ), that is, V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0)
and V (x0 + p,−CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0). Let vb ∈
⋃
V b
T
∈A(x0−p)[U(VT + CT ) − R
q
+] and v
s ∈⋃
V b
T
∈A(x0+p)[U(VT −CT )−R
q
+]. Then, v
b = U(V bT +CT )− rb and vs = U(V sT −CT )− rs
for some V bT ∈ A(x0 − p), V sT ∈ A(x0 + p) and rbn, rsm ∈ Rq+. By the concavity of U , we
have
1
2
vb +
1
2
vs ≤ U(1
2
V bT +
1
2
V sT )−
1
2
(rb + rs).
Note that for any V bT ∈ A(x0−p) and V sT ∈ A(x0+p), we have V bT+p, V sT−p ∈ A(x0) and
1
2V
b
T +
1
2V
s
T ∈ A(x0) by Assumption 4.2 d. Then, U(12V bT + 12V sT )− 12(rb+ rs) ∈ V (x0, 0)
and hence, 12v
b + 12v
s ∈ V (x0, 0).
Now, for any V b ∈ V (x0 − p,CT ), V s ∈ V (x0 + p,−CT ), there exists sequences (vbn) ∈⋃
V b
T
∈A(x0−p)[U(VT+CT )−R
q
+], (v
s
m) ∈
⋃
V b
T
∈A(x0+p)[U(VT−CT )−R
q
+]with limn→∞ v
b
n =
V b and limn→∞ vsn = V s. Since for each n,m ≥ 1, 12vbn + 12vsm ∈ V (x0, 0) and since
V (x0, 0) is closed, we have
1
2V
b + 12V
s ∈ V (x0, 0), which proves that
1
2
V (x0 − p,CT ) + 1
2
V (x0 + p,−CT ) ⊆ V (x0, 0). (31)
As V (x0−p,CT ), V (x0+p,CT ), V (x0, 0) are lower closed sets and both V (x0−p,CT ), V (x0+
p,−CT ) are supersets of V (x0, 0), (31) holds only if we have V (x0−p,CT ) = V (x0, 0) =
V (x0 + p,−CT ).
2. Let p ∈ P b(CT ) ∩ P s(CT ). Then, by Proposition 4.8, V (x0 − p,CT ) = V (x0, 0). More-
over, by Assumption 4.2 d., and by Remark 4.3 d., V (x0 − p + ǫ, CT ) ) V (x0, 0)
for any ǫ ∈ intRd+. Thus, p − ǫ /∈ P b(CT ) ∩ P s(CT ) for any ǫ ∈ intRd+. Then,
int (P b(CT ) ∩ P s(CT )) = ∅.
Proof of Proposition 4.9. We will show that P b(CT ) is closed. By Proposition 4.7, it is enough
to show that bdP b(CT ) ⊆ P b(CT ). Moreover, as P b(CT ) is a lower set for any p ∈ bdP b(CT ),
there exists a sequence (pn)n≥1 ∈ P b(CT ) such that pn+1 ≥ pn for all n ≥ 1 and limn→∞ pn =
p. The proof will be complete if
V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇
⋂
n≥1
V (x0 − pn, CT ) (32)
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holds. Indeed, together with the fact that V (x0 − pn, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0) for all n ≥ 1, (32)
implies that V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇
⋂
n≥1 V (x0 − pn, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0); hence p ∈ P b(CT ).
In order to show (32), first note that A(x0 − p) =
⋂
n≥1A(x0 − pn) by Assumption 4.2 e.
Then, we have
V (x0 − p,CT ) = cl
⋃
VT∈A(x0−p)
(
U(VT + CT )− Rq+
)
= cl {U(VT + CT )− r| ∀n ≥ 1 : VT ∈ A(x0 − pn), r ∈ Rq+}
= cl
⋂
n≥1
⋃
VT∈A(x0−pn)
(
U(VT + CT )− Rq+
)
.
Let y ∈ ⋂n≥1 V (x0 − pn, CT ). Since y is an element of the lower image V (x0 − pn, CT ), it
is true that {y} − intRq+ ⊆
⋃
VT∈A(x0−pn)
(
U(VT + CT )− Rq+
)
for all n ≥ 1. Let (yk)k≥1 ∈
{y} − intRq+ be a sequence with limk→∞ yk = y. Clearly, for each k ≥ 1,
yk ∈ ⋂n≥1⋃VT∈A(x0−pn)
(
U(VT + CT )− Rq+
)
, hence
y ∈ cl
⋂
n≥1
⋃
VT∈A(x0−pn)
(
U(VT + CT )− Rq+
)
.
Proof of Proposition 4.12. Assume for a proof by contradiction that V (x0, 0) ⊆ intV (x0 −
p,CT ). Hence, there exists ǫ > 0 such that V (x0 − p,CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0) + B(0, ǫ). It is enough
to show that there is p˜ > p such that
V (x0 − p˜, CT ) +B(0, ǫ) ⊇ V (x0 − p,CT ) (33)
as this implies that V (x0 − p˜, CT ) ⊇ V (x0, 0), hence p˜ ∈ P b(CT ), which contradicts that
p ∈ bdP b(CT ). To proof (33) note that as each u ∈ U is uniformly continuous, there exists
δ > 0 such that ‖x− y‖ ≤ δ implies that |u(x)− u(y)| ≤ ǫ√
q
. Let δ˜ ∈ (0, δ) and p˜ := p+ δ˜ e‖e‖ ,
where e ∈ Rd is the vector of ones. Note that
V (x0 − p˜, CT ) +B(0, ǫ) =
⋃
VT∈A(x0−p˜)
U(VT + CT ) +B(0, ǫ)− Rq+
=
⋃
VT∈A(x0−p)
U(VT + CT − δ˜ e‖e‖) +B(0, ǫ)− R
q
+,
as A(x0− p˜) = A(x0−p)− δ˜ e‖e‖ . Let U(VT +CT )−r ∈ V (x0−p,CT ) for some VT ∈ A(x0−p)
and r ∈ Rq+. Clearly, for each u ∈ U and Q ∈ Q, we have∣∣∣∣EQ[u(VT + CT )]− EQ[u(VT + CT − δ˜ e‖e‖)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ√q .
Then ∥∥∥∥U(VT + CT )− U(VT + CT − δ˜ e‖e‖)
∥∥∥∥
=
( s∑
j=1
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣EQj(ui(VT + CT )− ui(VT + CT − δ˜ e‖e‖))
∣∣∣∣
2) 1
2
≤ ǫ
Hence, U(VT + CT )− r ∈ U(VT + CT − δ˜ e‖e‖) +B(0, ǫ)− Rq+ and (33) holds.
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